Power, Protection and Penguins: Europe's Path to Strategic Autonomy in a Tech-Driven World

"Even if he caught him and brought him back to the colony, he would immediately head right back for the mountains... but why?"— Werner Herzog

Werner Herzog's penguin marches toward the mountains not without reason, but with a nihilistic hunger for freedom–certain death perhaps, although on its own terms. And yet he walks. Europe finds itself in a similar predicament, and the mountains have never felt more out of reach. The path toward them leads away from server farms in Virginia and semiconductor fabs in Taiwan; it is almost entirely obscured by smoke from a Middle East in flames.

Europe faces threats on two fronts in a world where power is no longer simply measured by military might. Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that territorial conquest and conventional warfare remain the most immediate risks to European security. At the same time, however, Europe's dependence on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure and critical technologies is exposing the continent to quieter but no less consequential forms of coercion. Territorial defence and technological sovereignty are not separate policy domains, but mutually reinforcing prerequisites for genuine European autonomy.

Treating these challenges as separate entities has become untenable. Without credible territorial defence, Europe cannot deter military aggression, and without control over the technologies that underpin its economies, governments and armed forces, it cannot act autonomously.

Territorial Imperative

Europe's response to the war in Ukraine over the past three years has been significant, as member states continue to provide extensive military aid and impose comprehensive sanctions on Russia. European NATO members have increased defense spending, with Germany specifically abandoning its post-war reluctance and increasing its military capabilities.

Yet structural vulnerabilities remain pervasive, and Europe still depends heavily on United States security guarantees. America's increasing political volatility and accusations of European 'free riding' raise uncomfortable questions about the reliability of transatlantic defense commitments. It is becoming apparent that Europe cannot continue to outsource its territorial defense.

The solution is not merely to increase defense expenditure, but to develop sustainable deterrence capabilities. This requires investment in advanced military technologies, integrated command structures and sufficient conventional forces to defend European territory without assuming automatic US intervention. The European Union's 2022 Strategic Compass committed member states to integrate their defense capabilities, including coordinated procurement and rapid deployment forces.

Whilst the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity became operational in 2025, security investments and military capabilities remain unevenly distributed across member states. Poland and the Baltic states, acutely aware of their proximity to Russia, now lead NATO in defense spending as a share of GDP. Whilst larger economies such as Italy and Spain continue to fall short of the NATO-recommended 2% threshold, undermining collective readiness. True territorial security demands that European states treat defense as a shared existential priority as opposed to simply being a discretionary expense.

Beyond Borders: Technological and Economic Security

Territorial defense alone is insufficient. In a world where technological innovation and integration define almost all aspects of modern life, Europe cannot focus solely on conventional military threats. As political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman argue, ‘weaponized interdependence’ allows states to exert coercive power by controlling critical nodes within global networks. Europe's openness, its deep integration into global trade, its welcoming of foreign investment, and its early embrace of American-built digital infrastructure, was a great economic asset in the post-war era, but has today become a vulnerability that external powers exploit.

Consider semiconductors, which underpin modern technologies from consumer electronics to military systems. US export controls on advanced semiconductors led to pressure on the Netherlands and restricted the Dutch company ASML’s exports to China. This shows how control over critical technologies translates into geopolitical leverage. By preventing China from acquiring advanced lithography equipment through ASML the US prioritised its strategic interests. Affecting a European company's profits in the process, leading to fewer resources for R&D and technological development.

Europe's dependence on US-based cloud providers illustrates similar vulnerabilities. Amazon, Microsoft and Google store vast amounts of European data, including personal information, corporate records and whole government systems. Yet under the US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, this data must be shared with the US government, even if stored in Europe. This creates a fundamental sovereignty problem as critical European infrastructure is being operated under foreign legal jurisdiction.

Europe has responded primarily through regulation. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act and artificial intelligence governance frameworks demonstrate a European preference for rules-based governance. In Anu Bradford's ‘The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World’, she illustrates how EU regulations often become global standards as companies seeking European market access must comply with them.

However, as Bradford notes, regulation alone cannot mitigate risk, especially when regulated entities whose ultimate legal obligations lie outside of European jurisdiction. The US government's approach to emerging big tech, by contrast, has involved close alignment between state authorities and private firms. This is problematic as it concentrates power and leads to limited transparency. Europe's challenge therefore is in increasing its technological capacity without abandoning democratic oversight.

A Framework for Action

Europe's real leverage lies not in technological innovation or market dominance but in combining its regulatory influence with tangible capabilities. The EU's 2023 European Economic Security Strategy identified threats to supply chains, technology security and critical infrastructure as core risks to European security, positioning technology policy as fundamentally a security issue.

Over two years later, Europe still lacks a comprehensive implementation framework for this strategy. However, recent developments suggest momentum is building. In January the European Parliament voted 471-68 to direct the European Commission to reduce reliance on foreign technology providers, acknowledging that the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80% of digital products, services and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the EuroStack initiative–a movement of over 300 European tech CEOs, academics and civil society organizations–is pushing for a strategic vision for Europe and the creation of a fairer, greener and more democratic digital economy. As part of an effort to “build Europe’s digital future," the initiative advocates for a sovereign European cloud infrastructure, federated data exchanges and European-controlled technology platforms.

In March 2025, European cloud providers Ionos and Aruba created a common technical standard– Sovereign European Cloud API (SECA)–that allows businesses to switch between cloud services without being locked into one provider. This demonstrates that European companies can build technological independence without waiting for EU directives. If Europe is to continue along this path to strategic autonomy, it is clear decision makers will need to follow some objectives:

1. Protect critical sectors through strategic investment and supply chain diversification. This means reducing dependence on any single foreign supplier for technologies essential to security and economic functioning. The European Chips Act represents progress, but semiconductor production not only requires financial investment, but sustained commitment.
2. Build domestic capacity in foundational technologies. Europe must develop secure cloud infrastructure under European legal jurisdiction and invest in AI, quantum computing and advanced materials. The EuroStack initiative and SECA standard demonstrate that European actors are already building alternatives to dependency. This would give Europe real agency, ensuring it shapes the technological systems defining global power rather than merely responding to decisions made in Washington and Silicon Valley.
3. Embed technology governance into external relations. Europe should leverage its regulatory power strategically, ensuring trade agreements and partnerships advance technological sovereignty. The January Parliament vote provides a mandate for the EC to negotiate from a position of technological independence.

Yet stating objectives is insufficient. Implementation requires institutional coordination across member states with divergent interests: France prioritizes digital sovereignty; Germany fears tech protectionism could harm exports; and smaller states lack capacity for autonomous tech development. The European Council's unanimity requirements and EC's limited enforcement powers creates a gap between strategy and action. Without addressing these institutional barriers, ambitious strategies risk becoming shelved as aspirational documents instead of being implemented as policy.

Toward Strategic Autonomy

Critics may characterize strengthening conventional defense whilst simultaneously pursuing technological sovereignty as impossible given resource constraints. Yet this criticism misinterprets what is at stake here. This is not merely about protection; it is about autonomy. It is about Europe's capacity to make sovereign choices that align with its values. It is not a choice between territorial defense and economic security, as both are prerequisites for genuine autonomy.

Modern warfare increasingly depends on technological superiority, from cyber capabilities to AI-enabled systems. Europe cannot defend its territory without controlling the technologies that define contemporary military power. It cannot chart an independent course on climate policy, data privacy or democratic governance whilst critical infrastructure operates under foreign control and essential supply chains are controlled by powers with divergent interests.

Consider what genuine policy autonomy requires in practice: the ability to direct public investment into European-owned green technologies without being undercut by foreign subsidies; to enforce data privacy standards without carve-outs for American cloud providers operating under US law; and to procure next-generation defense systems without dependence on Washington's political will.

These are not abstract ambitions – they are the concrete tests of whether European sovereignty is real or merely rhetorical. That question, real or rhetorical, is ultimately what the return of great power politics forces Europe to answer. True autonomy requires building frameworks that give Europe control over both the military capabilities defending its territory and the technological infrastructures determining sovereignty in the 21st century.

Like Herzog's nihilistic penguins marching toward the mountains with a hunger for freedom, Europe too must take the uncertain and elusive path to find its own form of emancipation. Herzog asked, 'But why?' The answer for the penguins and for Europe is the same, because dependence, however comfortable, is its own kind of death. What these penguins truly are is autonomous – and without autonomy, Europe risks sacrificing the democratic ideals and rule of law upon which it was built.