A Stronger Europe? Senator Calenda on Defense, Strategy, and Unity

In an increasingly unstable international context, and given the difficulties in relations with some traditional allies, should Europe begin to look for new strategic partners? And, if so, toward whom specifically?

Within itself. Europe has a competitive edge that can stem from the genuine construction of the internal market according to the plans of (Mario) Draghi (The Draghi report on EU competitiveness)and (Enrico) Letta, and from a harmonization of industrial policy that surpasses any free trade agreement with any country, including the United States.

This does not mean that the (European) Commission did not do very well to conclude the agreement with MERCOSUR and with India, even if these are not yet definitive agreements; however, the fact remains that the first free trade agreement we must conclude, the first market we must complete, is our own.

This historic moment seems decisive for Europe's future: it can strengthen its unity or accentuate its divisions. Beyond rearmament, what other steps do you consider necessary to build a stronger and truly united Union?

The first thing is to vote for those who want a stronger and more cohesive Europe. This is a fact we must internalize: there is no way to build Europe unless we vote for pro-European parties. In other words, if we do not vote for pro-European parties, we will not have Europe. So it starts with us, the citizens; there is no mechanism whereby, at some point, the states will voluntarily give up their sovereignty. States, unless they have promised it to their citizens, will not do so, because they want to hold onto power.

So the [solution to the] issue is having strongly pro-European political platforms in the countries and voting for them; otherwise, we will not have Europe. Whatever happens, Europe won’t get stronger, because states do not cede sovereignty and power, unless the citizens are behind them, demanding that sovereignty and power be ceded.

As we're talking about moving toward a more united Europe, Mario Draghi's report on EU competitiveness aims for greater European industrial and strategic integration.

In your view, is there truly political consensus today to achieve this? And personally, what about this project convinces you, and what doesn't?

I found that report very convincing in its near-completeness. In my view, there are some points regarding energy where it could have been more explicit – for example, we need a European nuclear plan.

I want to emphasize something that is difficult to grasp: closing the gap in defense also means closing the gap in technology, because the technological challenges we face–such as the lack of European server providers–are what hold us back in defense, but they also hold us back in industry. The lack of a low-orbit, low-latency satellite system is a problem for industry and a problem for defense. The lack of major players in command-and-control software is a problem for defense, but it's also a problem for artificial intelligence, so that report covers 90% of what needs to be done.

Is there a consensus today to do this? No. Because all the countries are in a massive mess of domestic politics, and to do this you have to give in – it means you have to accept a hostile takeover of a bank in Germany, you have to accept a hostile takeover of a bank in France, you have to accept the purchase of an arms factory. Just think that today, our Patriot missiles–or the equivalent of Patriot missiles–we produce 200 a year, which is what the Ukrainians use in four days, aren't produced in a single place, and production isn't expanded because France and Italy don't want them produced elsewhere. But with this logic, it's clear that nothing gets done.

Instead, following reports of Russian funding to European parties (including Italian ones), how can Europe defend itself against political influence that also involves its own decision-makers?

Two years ago, we introduced a bill with the same name as the one recently proposed by the European Commission, namely ‘Democratic Shield’, which provides for oversight not only of funding through intelligence –which our agencies are currently unable to carry out because it often involves politicians who are therefore protected (you can only monitor a politician if you have evidence of terrorist acts)–but also requires that if you have evidence or suspicions of foreign money flows, you must be able to investigate them, because it is a matter of national security.

So we have made a proposal on this, but also, for example, regarding the ban on the use of generative artificial intelligence, which tainted the elections in Romania that were subsequently annulled by the Constitutional Court. So the proposal is there – unfortunately, it must be approved not at the European level because it concerns the legislation of individual countries, but we in Italy are continuing to push for it.

To conclude, let's now turn our attention westward: with the upcoming midterms in the US, what consequences do you think a victory or defeat for Donald Trump could have for Italy and the Meloni government?

A Trump defeat will have consequences. The problem is how Trump will handle the defeat, and the problem is that after Trump there is a man named J.D. Vance, who is entirely in the hands of Peter Thiel, the owner of Palantir and a self-proclaimed fascist. We see the problem as relating only to Trump, and I understand that because Trump is a madman, like Emperor Caligula, but the problem runs much deeper: in the United States, there is now a tech oligarchy that no longer wants democracy, and we will have to deal with this – that is, there is a de facto separation of the West between Europe and the United States that we must acknowledge.