Putin’s announcement to launch and host Intervision, a rival to the Eurovision Song Contest, is easy to dismiss as unserious or irrelevant to global affairs. But not only is the decision indeed serious, it is one those in the West ought to praise, not dismiss or deride. Intervision is a serious endeavor by Putin to achieve deliberate foreign policy objectives through means often underestimated or underappreciated by the West, while also adapting to regionalization and high market demand for local cultural production.
Putin’s announcement in February that he planned to revive the Intervision Song Contest was, to many in the West, relatively amusing. But it should not be underestimated, as it forms part of a larger push by Russia to develop rival international institutions: in banking, defense, and now culture. In this case, Intervision is intended to compete with the Eurovision Song Contest following Russia’s continuing exclusion since 2022 after it invaded Ukraine.
Many in the West and North America may find Intervision a strange presidential priority for Putin, but the importance of Intervision to the Russian leader is quite straightforward. Eurovision is a massive forum for soft-power, one which Russia is now excluded from. Eurovision is the largest song contest in the world, attracting hundreds of millions of viewers every year as countries compete for the best original song, a musical Olympics of sorts. During the Cold War, states under the USSR umbrella were not allowed to compete. But when the Iron Curtain fell, those states joined Eurovision for the first time and had immediate success. The contest was dominated by Eastern European victories in the 2000’s with Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Serbia and Russia all winning between 2001 and 2008.
Many in the West derided these wins and framed them as political collusion representing anti-Western bias. In reality, these countries were maximizing a newfound platform to present themselves to the European community, to prove to the West they were just as sophisticated and talented. While Germany or the UK often sent amateur artists, Russia and Ukraine were sending their most famous stars. For states striving to join Western Europe, Eurovision gave critical exposure, and a win, if it could be clenched, was an incredible PR opportunity. Russia poured vast financial resources into hosting, with it being the most expensive to date at the time. Putin was very much involved.
Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia also invested heavily in the contest, seeing participation as a way to build up their recognition, reputation, and linkage to the European project. This is necessarily connected, especially for Turkey and Georgia, with aspirations to join the EU. Like Eastern Europe, Turkey and the Caucuses take the contest very seriously and send their best artists: Turkey won in 2004, and Azerbaijan in 2012, with Azerbaijan even building a brand-new arena to host after winning, still the most expensive contest to date. The logic of action is similar to Russia and China’s goals in hosting the Olympics in Sochi and Beijing (twice), and Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s (planned) hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2022 and 2034.
But Putin had another reason to value Eurovision and to seek to replicate it: the public vote. The winner is decided 50/50 between juries and the public, where audiences in participating countries vote remotely for their favorite acts and decide how their country awards their points. Points are awarded separately per country from its jury and public – making preferences of mass publics clear. These preferences are influenced both by the quality (or other appeal) of the songs, but often equally by geographic political and cultural voting patterns or current events. Israel in the 2024 contest demonstrated the power of this dramatically, (although ethical questions remain around how it achieved it), when its entrant came second in the public vote. This meant that it received more votes from the aggregated public of the forty countries than every other country – minus Croatia- who came first in the public vote in 2024. In the face of months of protests over Israeli actions in Gaza, and European government statements critical of Israel, the Israeli government and pro-Israel press utilized the overwhelming public support to claim political validation. Doing so, they undercut perceptions of mass public disapproval with their actions, regardless of how they may or may not have corresponded with reality, leveraging the legitimation Putin and other leaders outside of the European core sought to achieve from participation, in vain.
Now that Russia is no longer in Eurovision, its access to certain soft-power benefits such as these are closed off. Intervision would still allow Russia to showcase its cultural prowess and build support for and interest in Russia. But it will not provide it any public legitimacy from the West, nor will it tie it any closer to Europe. Noting this, many may perceive Putin’s attempt as foolish and a gimmick, not worth an ounce of attention or support from the West. This mistakenly, however, assumes Putin considers public support for Russia from Europe the only valid source of legitimation – which he does not.
It is also true that Intervision is unlikely to become a lasting rival. Others have tried and none have succeeded – especially when pitted as a direct alternative. But the effort to launch Intervision should not be supported for its potential futility, but instead because of its promise.
Intervision provides an alternative for states around the world that are excluded for either geographic reasons, by consequence of their own actions (Russia, Belarus, etc.), or for states simply unwilling to compete in or broadcast the boundary-pushing Eurovision. As it relates to the second and third groups, support for the contest could be critiqued as tacit approval of authoritarian controls on media and expression. In addition, Intervision will likely be framed as a contest for those locked out of the Western system, painting Eurovision as a closed club of elite states embracing socially deviant art and music. While both are fair points, there is also a market for it around the world – even in Europe. And Intervision will also, in some respects, be a more inclusive and diverse show than Eurovision by not barring any states from competing.
Intervision also allows Russia to replicate public legitimacy performance through televoting: the message of non-Western states voting en masse for a Russian entry writes its own propaganda. Despite this unsavory possibility- if millions come to eventually choose to watch Intervision, especially in countries without significant digital restrictions, is the contest not meeting a valuable market gap? And, assuming Intervision maintains a somewhat democratic voting system like its peer, it is entirely possible that the legitimation that Putin craves may not end up in his lap at all – Russia’s participation will likely not guarantee its success.
Furthermore, the participation of other states need not be taken at face value as support for Russia over the West. While participation is an act of tacit approval of the alternative cultural model Intervision stands for, it is not equivalent to support for Russia specifically. If that was the case, explaining Finland’s past participation in the Cold-War edition of Intervision would be difficult. Supporting Intervision then, recognizes and appreciates the larger project of platforming and recognizing non-Western music and culture. The fact that non-European countries, or those outside the Eurovision participant list, are seeking to develop alternatives more “appropriate” to their own regional histories, cultures, musical styles, and entertainment preferences should be encouraged. Even if such efforts coincide with attempts to move away from liberal ideals, they still represent a genuine attempt at local production of cultural events outside Western systems or expectations.
Finally, a bit of competition for Eurovision offers the contest a chance to return to its roots and re-evaluate its identity and purpose. Intervision’s emergence should incentivize Eurovision to pursue a strategy building on its values, strengths, and history. Putin’s attempt to create an alternative to Eurovision shouldn’t push Eurovision to become more like Intervision, it should push Eurovision to become more like Eurovision: connecting people and cultures while offering a forum for free expression, artistic innovation, inclusivity, and fun. Not unlike politics or business, reacting to competition by replicating it can lead to product dilution – something from which Eurovision is hopefully wise enough to steer clear.
Altogether, for geopolitical observers, fans of Eurovision and those completely indifferent alike – Putin’s call to organize an Intervision Song Contest should not be ignored or dismissed as just an amusing authoritarian gimmick, nor should it be opposed altogether. Intervision is a serious endeavor by Putin to achieve deliberate foreign policy objectives through means often underestimated or underappreciated by the West, while also adapting to regionalization and high market demand for local cultural production that the West would equally do well to appreciate, if not ultimately support. And for Eurovision in the meantime – keep up the fun!
Sydney Wilhelmy is a first-year MIA Student at the Hertie School in the International Security Track, originally from the United States.
The views of the author are his own, not that of The Governance Post.